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Abstract
The governments of many developing countries seek to attract inbound foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) through the use of tax incentives for multinational corporations (MNCs). The ef-
fectiveness of these tax incentives depends crucially on MNCs’ residence country tax regime,
especially where the residence country imposes worldwide taxation on foreign income. Tax spar-
ing provisions are included in many bilateral tax treaties to prevent host country tax incentives
being nullified by residence country taxation. We analyse the impact of tax sparing provisions us-
ing panel data on bilateral FDI stocks from 23 OECD countriesin 113 developing and transition
economies over the period 2002-2012, coding tax sparing provisions in all bilateral tax treaties
among these countries. We find that tax sparing agreements are associated with up to 97 percent
higher FDI. The estimated effect is concentrated in the yearfollowing the entry into force of tax
sparing agreements, with no effects in prior years, and is thu consistent with a causal interpreta-
tion. Four countries - Norway in 2004, and the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand in 2009 - enacted
tax reforms that moved them from worldwide to territorial taxation, potentially changing the value
of their preexisting tax sparing agreements. However, there is no detectable effect of these reforms
on bilateral FDI in tax sparing countries, relative to nonsparing countries. These results are con-
sistent with tax sparing being an important determinant of FDI in developing countries for MNCs
from both worldwide and territorial home countries.
Keywords: FDI; international tax; development; tax sparing.
JEL classification: H25 ; F21; F35.
* We thank the Editor (Wojciech Kopczuk), two anonymous referes, Julia Braun, Mihir Desai, Rodolphe Desbordes,
Jane Gravelle, Ruud de Mooij, Shang-Jin Wei, and Jing Xing for helpful comments and discussions, along with seminar
participants at the Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the ninth Annual Symposium
of the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, the International Institute of Public Finance Annual Congress,
and the National Tax Association meetings. Morgen Miller ofthe Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at the
University of Chicago Law School provided outstanding research assistance. Dharmapala also acknowledges the financial
support of the Lee and Brena Freeman Faculty Research Fund atthe University of Chicago Law School. Any remaining
errors or omissions are, of course, our own.
†Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow. E-mail:ce ine.azemar@glasgow.ac.uk.
‡University of Chicago Law School. Email: dharmap@uchicago.
1
1 Introduction
Attracting inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations (MNCs) has long
been an important objective of many governments in developing and transition economies. One moti-
vation is the possibility that FDI creates positive spillovers for local firms. It may also be the case that
FDI results in more efficient patterns of common ownership ofassets across jurisdictions, as stressed
for instance by Desai and Hines (2003). Thus, the determinants of FDI (both in developing coun-
tries and more broadly) have been analysed extensively in the in ernational economics and economic
development literatures. At the same time, scholars in public finance have focused on the impact
of corporate tax rates and of various features of the internaio l tax regime - including bilateral tax
treaties - on the location of FDI (e.g. Blonigen and Davies (2004); Dharmapala and Hines (2009)).1
In view of the perceived benefits of FDI and of the sensitivityof FDI to taxes, many governments of
developing countries offer tax holidays and other tax incentiv s for MNCs. The effectiveness of these
measures, however, depends in crucial respects on the tax regime prevailing in the MNC’s country of
residence (where the parent firm is headquartered).
In the terminology of international taxation, the income generated by normal business operations
in the source country (in which MNC affiliates undertake busine s activity) is referred to as "active"
business income, whereas other income (such as interest androyalties) is referred to as "passive"
income. Residence countries with "worldwide" tax systems ipose tax on the active foreign busi-
ness income of resident MNCs (generally with a credit for taxes paid to the source country). Res-
idence countries with "territorial" (or "exemption") systems exempt the "active" foreign income of
their MNCs from residence country taxation (so that this income is only taxed by the source country).
However, both worldwide and territorial residence countries typically tax the passive foreign income
earned by their resident MNCs.
When a source country institutes a tax holiday for an MNC based in a worldwide residence coun-
try, the benefit to the MNC from the tax holiday may be fully or partially undone by higher taxes owed
to the residence country. This is because the lower tax paid to the source country lowers not only the
local affiliate’s tax liability, but also the tax credit available to the parent in its residence jurisdiction
when the local affiliate pays a dividend to the parent. This off etting effect applies to both active and
passive income. For MNCs based in a territorial residence country, the same effect holds for passive
income, but not for active income (which its residence country does not seek to tax, regardless of
whether the source country offers a tax holiday). As MNCs care about their combined tax liability to
1See Hines (1999) and De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for surveys.
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both governments, the source country’s aim of attracting more FDI will thus be frustrated, especially
when the residence country imposes worldwide taxation.
This fundamental problem has been discussed extensively since the 1950’s, when the Royal Com-
mission on the Taxation of Profits and Income recommended that the U.K. offer tax relief to its
resident firms through its tax treaties in circumstances such as these. Since then, the U.K., Japan and
many other residence countries - with the notable exceptionof the United States - have developed
an extensive network of tax sparing agreements, primarily with developing source countries (as doc-
umented in Section 3 below). Tax sparing agreements are provisions that form part of bilateral tax
treaties. They provide, in essence, that the residence country agrees to provide its resident MNCs with
a tax credit for taxes that would ordinarily have been due to the source country, but that are foregone
(or "spared") by the source country pursuant to a programme of tax incentives. This ensures that the
source country’s attempts to provide tax incentives for FDIare not undone by the residence country’s
taxes (even when the residence country has a worldwide tax system).
There has been extensive discussion among scholars of international tax law and policy of the
normative justifications for tax sparing agreements and therelated question of whether developing
countries should offer tax incentives for FDI (Brooks, 2009). However, the empirical literature on the
effects of tax sparing agreements is quite limited. Hines (2001) analyses cross-sectional data for 1990
on the location of FDI by Japanese and U.S. MNCs in 67 source countries. He finds that Japanese FDI
is substantially higher, relative to U.S. FDI, in source countries with which Japan has a tax sparing
agreement. U.S. FDI serves here as a control, as both Japan and the U.S. had worldwide tax systems,
while the U.S. has no tax sparing agreements. The magnitude of the effect is very large: Japanese
FDI stocks in sparing countries were found to be 1.4 to 2.4 times larger (i.e. 40 percent to 140 percent
larger) than in the absence of tax sparing agreements. Azémar et al. (2007) use panel data on FDI
by Japanese MNCs in 29 source countries (of which 13 have tax sp ring agreements with Japan)
over 1989-2000. There is essentially no within-country variation in tax sparing agreements over this
period, and so Azémar et al. (2007) use random effects estimates and examine the impact of the
length of time that has elapsed since a tax sparing agreemententered into force. Their results suggest
that each additional year subsequent to the signature of a tax sp ring provision increases Japanese
FDI activity by 2.3-11 percent. In common with Hines (2001),they find a large overall effect, with
Japanese FDI flows being 2.8 times larger in tax sparing countries.
These studies suggest that tax sparing is an important determinant of FDI, and cast some doubt on
the OECD’s (1998, p. 5) claim that: "Investment decisions taken by international investors resident in
credit [worldwide] countries are rarely dependent on or even influenced by the existence or absence
3
of tax sparing provisions in treaties". However, these studies are based on studying FDI from one
residence country - Japan - that had a worldwide system priorto 2009, and so are unable to measure
the impact of tax sparing for MNCs from a wider set of residence countries (including those with
territorial systems). Moreover, they are unable to use longitudinal variation in tax sparing agreements
to address potential unobserved heterogeneity at the levelof the residence-source-country-pair, and
have no source of quasi-experimental variation in the existnce or value of tax sparing agreements.
This paper analyses the effects of tax sparing agreements onFDI using a large panel dataset on
bilateral FDI from the OECD. The data consists of stocks of FDI from 23 OECD-member residence
countries to 113 developing and transition source countries over the period 2002-2012. The dataset
is identified at the country-pair-year level, and the baseline estimating sample includes 8,974 obser-
vations on 1,176 country-pairs. We code tax sparing agreements by searching the text of all existing
bilateral tax treaties between any of the 23 residence countries and any of the 113 source countries
for language specifying a tax sparing provision. While mosttax sparing agreements entered into
force prior to 2002, we identify 34 instances in which new taxsparing agreements entered into force
or in which existing tax sparing agreements were terminatedover 2002-2012; 32 of these changes
that occurred after 2002 provide usable longitudinal variation. In our dataset, a substantial number
- 6.5 percent - of the observations are zeros (indicating theabsence of any FDI from the residence
to the source country in that year).2 In order to address these econometric issues, we use a Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) fixed effects estimator (with country-pair fixed effects and year
effects).
We analyse both the impact of tax sparing agreements and thatof the residence country tax system,
using several different sources of identification. The firstis the longitudinal variation generated by the
signing or termination of tax sparing agreements. We find that tax sparing agreements are associated
with a 86 percent higher stock of bilateral FDI. This estimate is statistically significant and substantial
in magnitude (albeit somewhat smaller than those in the existing literature reviewed above). However,
tax sparing agreements are of course potentially endogenous. For instance, an unobservable increase
in a source country’s salience in the U.K. may both lead to theU.K. signing a tax sparing agreement
with that source country and British MNCs investing more heavily in that country.
Unfortunately, there is no quasi-experimental variation in the signing or termination of tax sparing
agreements that can fully address this concern. We start with an instrumental variables (IV) strategy
2By using country-pair fixed effects we excludes from the analysis country-pairs with no FDI for the entire period of
investigation, as there is no within-country variations asociated with those pairs. Without excluding those country-pairs,
the proportion of zeros would be about half of the observations.
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based on instrumenting for tax sparing agreements using theaverage number of such agreements
signed between the residence country and countries that arein th same region as the source country.
The IV analysis yields an estimate that is slightly larger inmagnitude, implying that tax sparing agree-
ments are associated with a 97 percent higher stock of bilatera FDI. Following Baier and Bergstrand
(2007), another approach to address potential endogeneityis by including home-country-by-time and
host-country-by-time fixed effects in addition to the country-pairs fixed effects. In the absence of
an omitted variable bias, our results suggest that the inclusion of a tax sparing provision in bilateral
tax treaties leads to an increase of 54 percent in FDI from thesignatory country. Simultaneity is ad-
dressed as in Baier and Bergstrand (2007) and Yotov et al. (2016) by adding to the specification with
the rich set of fixed effects a lead variable that captures thefuture value of tax sparing. We find that the
"effects" prior to the tax sparing agreement entering into force are statistically insignificant and very
small. Rather, the estimated effect is concentrated in the year following the date of entry into force
of the agreement. This pattern is inconsistent with a pre-existing trend of increasing FDI between
countries that sign tax sparing agreements. Instead, it appears consistent with a causal interpretation
of the estimated effect of tax sparing agreements.
We also decompose the effects of tax sparing on FDI along the intensive and extensive margins.
Using a two-part model, we estimate separately a binary indicator for whether the bilateral FDI stock
is strictly greater than zero and the size of the FDI stock. Wefind that tax sparing has an impact on
the intensive margin but not the extensive margin of FDI.
The previous literature has not investigated the question of whether the effect of tax sparing agree-
ments differs across worldwide and territorial residence countries. We find no significant difference
in the estimated effect. While this may appear surprising, it is consistent with a scenario in which the
ability of worldwide MNCs to defer the payment ("repatriation") of dividends out of active income
from their foreign affiliates to their parent substantiallymitigates the burden of residence country
taxation. In such a scenario, the value of tax sparing for worldwide MNCs (where it applies to both
active and passive income) would tend to converge to that forerritorial MNCs (where it applies
only to passive income). In support of this interpretation,there is substantial evidence of worldwide
MNCs utilising the potential for deferral of residence country taxation (see for instance Dharmapala
et al. (2011) for U.S. MNCs; Egger et al. (2015) find that following the U.K.’s territorial tax reform
in 2009, U.K.-owned affiliates significantly increased repatriations, relative to a control group of non-
U.K.-owned affiliates).
Tax reforms in some of the residence countries in our datasetmoved them from worldwide to terri-
torial taxation of the foreign income of their resident MNCs. Among our residence countries, Norway
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implemented such a reform in 2004, while the U.K., Japan and New Zealand all implemented this type
of reform in 2009. These territorial reforms might be expected to have reduced the importance of tax
sparing agreements with developing countries (recall fromour earlier discussion that tax sparing ap-
plies to both passive and active income under a worldwide regim , while it only applies to the former
under a territorial regime). Arguably, these territorial reforms were motivated by concerns about the
competitiveness of resident MNCs in making foreign acquisitions (primarily in other developed coun-
tries) and by the possibility of changes in residence by MNCs, rather than by concerns related to the
promotion of economic development in developing countries. To that extent, the reforms provide a
source of arguably quasi-exogenous variation in the value of preexisting tax sparing provisions.3
Consistent with this interpretation, we also find that the territorial tax reforms in Norway, the U.K.,
Japan and New Zealand did not substantially reduce FDI from those countries to source countries
with which they have tax sparing agreements, relative to source countries with which they do not
have tax sparing agreements. If tax sparing is differentially v luable for worldwide MNCs, we would
expect that these territorial reforms would induce (in relative terms) a reallocation of FDI from sparing
to nonsparing countries. A difference-in-differences estima e of this effect can arguably be given
a causal interpretation, as the value of preexisting tax sparing agreements would be exogenously
reduced. However, the estimated effect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that
much of the benefit from tax sparing is available to territorial MNCs, an interpretation supported by
an additional finding that withholding tax rates on interestand royalties are strong determinants of
FDI, especially when we consider global effective withholding tax rates adjusted for the tax sparing
provision. This reinforces the continuing relevance of taxsparing in a world in which most residence
countries are territorial.
The apparent effect of tax sparing provisions may be due instead o a more general effect of
bilateral tax treaties (BTTs) on FDI (although the prior literature on BTTs finds little support for an
effect of tax treaties on FDI (Davies, 2004)). We thus construct an indicator for the existence of a
BTT for each country-pair in each year. On average, OECD countries include a tax sparing provision
in 31 percent of their BTTs with developing countries. Thus,it is feasible to disentangle the general
effect of BTTs from the specific impact of tax sparing. We find that in the absence of tax sparing,
BTTs are not associated with significant increases in FDI, while BTTs with tax sparing have a large
positive effect as in our baseline specification. The basic result is also robust to controlling for treaty
shopping. An investor from a third country might attempt to benefit from the existence of tax sparing
3These reforms have been studied, for instance, by Matheson et al. (2013), who analyse whether the territorial reforms
spurred greater tax competition among developing host countries.
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in the tax treaty between the resident and the source countries. We consider the potential effect of
past tax treaty shopping which can increase the apparent effect o tax sparing on bilateral FDI, when
FDI is no longer diverted via a third country. This analysis uses a variable measuring total FDI from
the home country to potential conduit countries, i.e. countries having a tax sparing provision with the
host country. The results indicate that the effect of tax sparing on bilateral FDI originating from the
home country is not overestimated by past treaty shopping practices.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presentsome background information on
tax sparing under territorial and worldwide tax systems. Section 3 introduces the data and estimation
strategy, while Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Tax Sparing under Territorial and Worldwide Tax Systems
The international tax regime is in large measure defined by a network of thousands of bilateral tax
treaties between countries. These have the stated purpose of avoiding double taxation or nontaxation
of income earned in one jurisdiction by entities resident inanother jurisdiction. Thus, treaties seek
to regulate the claims of source and residence jurisdictions t tax the same income. As discussed
previously, tax sparing agreements are implemented by means of specific provisions in bilateral tax
treaties with developing countries. An example is the Article 21 (on the “Elimination of Double
Taxation”) of the tax treaty between the U.K. and Sri Lanka, which states in part that:
“For the purposes of [the calculation of the U.K. tax credit], the term “Sri Lanka tax
payable” shall be deemed to include any amount which would have been payable as Sri
Lanka tax for any year but for an exemption or reduction of taxgranted for that year or
any part thereof under [various specified provisions of Sri Lankan law] ... [or] any other
provision which may subsequently be made granting an exemption or reduction of tax
which is agreed by the competent authorities to be of a substantially similar character...”.4
The crucial element of a tax sparing provision is thus that the tax credit permitted by the residence
country to its MNCs “shall be deemed to include” tax “spared”by the source country as well as taxes
actually paid to the source country.
As this description makes clear, tax sparing involves revenue losses for the residence country.
On the other hand, the source country benefits from the greater fficacy of any tax holidays or other
4Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/sy tem/uploads/attachment_data/file/412292/sri-lanka-
consol.pdf
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tax incentives that it chooses to grant in attracting FDI. Thus, in a manner that is described more
precisely below, tax sparing entails losses for the residence country and gains for the source country
(and residence country multinationals). It may thus seem puzzling that residence countries agree to tax
sparing provisions. One way to resolve this puzzle is to viewthese provisions as part of the foreign aid
policy of developed countries (OECD, 1998). They are designed to promote economic development
(via industrial, commercial, scientific, or educational development) by ensuring that special fiscal
incentive measures, used by the host country to attract FDI,are not nullified by the home country
tax system. Thus, to the extent that the residence country isalready providing other forms of aid to
the source country, the former can in principle reduce theseoth r forms of aid when a tax sparing
agreement is signed (by the expected cost to it of tax sparing). It is also worth bearing in mind that
tax treaties in general involve transfers of revenue from source to residence countries (e.g. by limiting
withholding taxes). Including a tax sparing agreement in a tax treaty results in some mitigation of this
transfer.5
Given the benefits of tax sparing, it may seem that all developing countries would wish to include
tax sparing agreements in their tax treaties. To the extent that they must give up alternative forms
of aid in order to do so, however, it is not clear that this is the case. In particular, their preference
for tax sparing will depend on the extent to which they plan tooffer tax holidays or incentives, and
on the value to them of alternative forms of aid that would have to be foregone. Perhaps as a result,
tax sparing agreements are fairly common (on average the OECD countries of our sample include
a tax sparing provision in 31 percent of their BTTs with developing countries), but far from being
widespread (as described below with respect to our summary statistics). There are, however, instances
of developing countries that insist on tax sparing agreements, and refuse to sign tax treaties that do
not contain these provisions. One example is Brazil, which does not have a tax treaty with the US.
The failure to reach agreement over many decades is generally attributed to Brazil’s insistence on the
inclusion of a tax sparing provision, combined with the unwillingness of the US to include one (see
Mitchell (1997) for a detailed account).
The willingness of developing countries to insist on tax sparing provisions suggests that they be-
lieve that these agreements matter in terms of attracting FDI. Even so, it would be helpful to know
whether multinational firms actually face lower tax rates inource countries with tax sparing agree-
ments. Unfortunately, this would require extensive data onthe taxes actually paid by firms at the
bilateral (country-pair) level, which is not available. However, Chow et al. (2017) collect data on
5Braun and Zagler (2018) find that the signing of tax treaties between developed and developing countries is associated
with an increase in official development assistance from theformer to the latter.
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the impact of foreign tax holidays over 1995-2013 on US multinational firms’ effective tax rates (as
reported in firms’ financial statements). They find that source country tax holidays substantially lower
US firms’ foreign tax rates - for instance, their summary stati ics (Table 2, p,. 40) show that the aver-
age tax rate is eight percentage points lower in firm-years with a tax holiday than in firm-years without
a tax holiday. This suggests that these firms would benefit quite s bstantially from tax sparing, were
it available (however, it is not, as the US has never entered into a tax sparing agreement). From this
study, it can be inferred that non-US multinational firms would also benefit substantially from foreign
tax holidays and thus from tax sparing (indeed, where tax sparing exists, incentives to participate in
foreign tax holidays which are provided by more than 80 percent of developing countries (OECD,
2015) would be even stronger than they are for US firms).
As foreshadowed in the discussion above, while most major OECD countries have signed tax
sparing agreements of this kind with developing countries since the 1960’s, the United States remains
a notable exception. In 1957, a tax sparing agreement appeared for the first time in a treaty negotiated
between the United States and Pakistan. However, this treaty has never been ratified by the U.S.
Senate because of legislators’ opposition to the inclusionof a tax sparing provision, and the United
States has subsequently not concluded any tax treaties containing sparing provisions. This position
was significantly influenced by the prominent tax law scholarand official Stanley Surrey of Harvard
Law School, who argued that tax sparing compromises the princi le of capital export neutrality and
that “ tax sparing irrationally granted credit for phantom taxes and that the attendant explanations for
non-payment of U.S. taxes were illogical” (as quoted in Toaze (2001), p 884). On the other hand,
from the perspective of developing countries, tax sparing is argued to represent an important tool to
exercise control over their tax incentive programs, as it would be much more difficult to attract foreign
investment without tax incentives that can be protected viatax sparing. Other important arguments put
forward by developing countries are that tax sparing allowsthem to target tax incentives to specific
sectors of the economy and to exert greater control over theidevelopment programme (Mitchell,
1997; Tillinghast, 1996).
The implications of tax sparing provisions are somewhat different for MNCs resident in territo-
rial countries and those resident in worldwide countries. The following discussion presents simple
expressions capturing the global tax costs faced by different types of income - earnings and prof-
its, dividends, royalties and interest - affected by tax sparing provisions. While there are substantial
differences in the tax laws of different countries, this discu sion uses stylised characterisations of
worldwide and territorial systems to provide a simple account that applies in general terms to most
countries.
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2.1 Tax Costs Without Tax Sparing
Territorial tax system
A territorial (or "exemption") tax system exempts dividends paid by foreign subsidiaries to their
parents. Consequently, profits made by domestic entrerpriss operating abroad are not subject to the
home country corporation tax, even if dividends are repatriated to the parent company. Other forms
of income such as royalties and interest receipts do not benefit from this exemption treatment. To
avoid double taxation, the parent company is eligible to claim foreign tax credit up to the value of
the home tax liability, for the withholding taxes paid abroad by its affiliates.
Thus, under a territorial tax system, income earned abroad is taxed at the foreign country effective
tax ratet
′
f . Depending on the amount of equity and debt injected by the par nt company and licenses
for intellectual property used by the affiliate, the income earn d will be repatriated as dividends,
paid as interest or royalties, or reinvested. The taxes paidabroad on a dividend payment ofDf
aret
′
fDf + w
′d
f (Df − t
′
fDf ), wherew
′d
f denotes the host country effective withholding tax rate on
dividends. Consequently, the global tax rate on a dividend payment from the affiliate to the parent is:
t′f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ).
The tax costs associated with interest and royalties dependon both host country and home country
tax liabilities. Host country income taxes are deductible from interest and royalties, but effective
withholding taxes on interest,w
′i
f , and on royalties,w
′r
f , have to be paid when they are repatriated.
Interest and royalties received by companies are taxed in the home country at the statutory tax rate,th,
with a credit for the withholding taxes paid. Because withholding taxes on interest and royalties are
generally lower than statutory tax rates, they are fully creditable against the home country statutory
tax rate. Thus the global tax rate on interest and royalty payments is generally,th.
Worldwide tax system
Under a worldwide tax system, taxes are levied on the worldwide income of resident corporations.
In order to avoid double taxation of the foreign income, investors are allowed to claim a foreign tax
credit for income taxes paid in the host country, up to the home country’s statutory tax rate,th. The
income earned abroad is taxed at ratet′f . The taxes paid abroad on a dividend payment ofDf are
t
′
fDf + w
′d
f (Df − t
′
fDf). Tax liabilities are calculated on the grossed-up dividendpaymentDf .
Allowing a tax credit for the foreign tax paid abroad, the global tax on a dividend payment is thusth
whenth > t′f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f) andt
′
f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f) whenth < t
′
f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ).
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Generally, firms can defer home taxes until the moment when thprofit is repatriated in the form
of dividends. This deferral is available on the active busine s profits of affiliates that are separately
incorporated as subsidiaries in foreign countries.6 In addition, most worldwide tax systems uses
the total worldwide foreign income of the taxpayer to calculate the foreign tax-credit limit. When
the foreign taxes paid exceed the source tax liability on foreign source income, the investor is in
an ‘excess credit’ position. Cross-crediting allows any excess credits from high-tax countries to be
applied to income from low-tax countries. Firms using deferral and/or being in an excess credit
position have a global tax rate on active income which converges with the one of firms coming from
a territorial tax system, as it mainly depends on the level offoreign taxes,t′f .
As in a territorial tax system, interest and royalty payments from a foreign affiliate are included
in resident companies’ taxable income, although a foreign tax credit is available. The global tax cost
of an interest or royalty payment is generallyth, since withholding taxes on interest and royalties are
generally lower thanth.
2.2 The Benefits of Tax Sparing
From the previous discussion, it is apparent that a fiscal incentive provided by the host country with
regard to the corporate tax rate and the dividend withholding tax rate - applied to an investor from a
worldwide tax system - simply lowers the amount of foreign tax credit which the investor can claim in
its home country. Similarly, a fiscal incentive with regard to interest and royalty withholding tax rates
- applied to an investor from either a worldwide or a territorial tax system - also reduces its foreign
tax credit, leaving unchanged the global tax paid. To address thi problem, many tax treaties include
tax sparing provisions of the type described above, allowing investors to obtain foreign tax credit for
taxes spared andnot actually paid in the host country. Thus under tax sparing, foreign income that
has benefited from a tax incentive program in the host countryis treated by the home country as if it
has been fully taxed in the host country.
6Profits of a foreign branch of a corporation are generally subject to corporate taxation at home even if not repatriated.
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Table 1: Impact of the Interaction of Resident Country and Source Country Tax Systems on Foreign Investors’ Corporate Income Taxes, With
and Without Tax Sparing
Without tax holiday (source country) With tax holiday (source country)
Source country taxation
Profit of subsidiary 100 100
Corporate income tax : 33.33% 33.33 0
After-tax profit 66.67 100
Dividend 66.67 100
Withholding tax : 10% 6.67 0
Territorial system Worldwide system Territorial system Worldwide system
without tax sparing
Worldwide system with
tax sparing
Residence country taxation
Dividend received 60 60 100 100 100
Grossed-up dividend n.a 100 n.a 100 100
Corporate income tax : 40% (a) n.a 40 n.a 40 40
Creditable foreign tax (b) n.a 40 n.a 0 40
Foreign tax credit (min (a, b)) n.a 40 n.a 0 40
Net corporate income tax (CIT) 0 0 0 40 0
Source country tax 40 40 0 0 0
Residence country tax 0 0 0 40 0
Total 40 40 0 40 0
After-tax profit 60 60 100 60 100
Note : CIT = Corporate income tax. Source: OECD (2001)
1
2
Table 2: Impact of the Interaction of Resident Country and Source Country Tax Systems on Foreign
Investors’ Interest Taxes, With and Without Tax Sparing
Base case 15%
withholding
5% withholding
without tax sparing
5% withholding with
tax sparing
Interest payment 100 100 100
Source country tax 15 5 5
Resident country tax rate % 40 40 40
Resident country tax 40 40 40
Foreign tax credit 15 5 15
Source country tax 15 5 5
Resident country tax 25 35 25
Total 40 40 30
After tax interest payment 60 60 70
Source: OECD (2001)
The benefits of tax sparing for active income, applied to “worldwide" investors, are illustrated in
Table 1. The first column considers a situation with a corporate t x rate of 33% in the host country
and a non-resident withholding tax rate of 10%. The “territoial" investor only pays taxes abroad, 40.
The “worldwide" investor is taxed on its worldwide income ata 40% corporate tax rate and can claim
a foreign tax credit corresponding to 40 (taxes paid abroad). In that case, the “worldwide" investor is
not subject to an additional tax in its resident country. Both “territorial" and “worldwide" investors
have an after-tax profit of 60. When the host country grants tax holidays, and without tax sparing,
the foreign tax credit of the “worldwide" investor is zero. Thus the investor pays a 40% tax rate to
its residential country and its after-tax profit is still 60.Without tax sparing, no tax benefits remain in
the hands of the investor, as the spared amount is transferred to the treasury of the developed country.
In contrast, when a tax sparing provision is signed between adeveloped and a developing country,
the home country provides a foreign tax credit equal to the amount of tax that would have been paid
without such incentives. The after-tax profit of the “worldwi e" investor corresponds to 100.
A similar illustration can be given to explain the benefits oftax sparing for passive income (for
both territorial and worldwide investors). In Table 2, we assume that the tax treaty between the
home country and the host country provides for a withholdingtax rate of up to 15% on interest. To
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improve its attractiveness, the host country decreases thetax on interest to 5%. Both “territorial"
and “worldwide" investors can claim a foreign tax credit equal to the foreign tax paid and if a tax
sparing provision exists, the tax credit will be deemed to beequal to 15% of the gross amount of the
interest. For an interest payment received by a parent company, the home country tax rate is 40%.
We characterise the investor’s total taxes under three diffrent situations. In the first column the host
country imposes interest tax at the maximum treaty rate of 15%. In this case, the total paid to the
home country is diminished by a foreign tax credit equal to 15% of the interest payment. In Column
(2), with a 5% withholding tax and no tax sparing, the total taxes paid by the investor are the same as
in the first column, with a tax base of 15%. The difference betwe n situations 1 and 2 is that when
the rate of withholding tax is reduced, the tax forgone by thehost country is paid to the home country.
Finally, when the 5% withholding is accompanied by tax sparing (Column (3)), the benefit of the
foreign tax incentives is preserved and less tax is paid in total.
2.3 Tax Costs With Tax Sparing
Territorial tax system
When a tax sparing provision is signed between a territorialhome country and a developing coun-
try, the tax costs associated with active income earned abroad and on dividend repatriations do not
change. However, for interest and royalty payments, the forign tax credit that investors can claim is
not reduced by host country fiscal incentives, since it is equal to the notional tax rate. At this stage of
the reasoning, we distinguish the host country notional withholding tax rate on interestwif from the
effective onew
′i
f , which can be expected to be lower than the notional one whenever tax incentives
are offered. The global tax cost of an interest payment is thu: th − wif + w
′i
f , allowing the investor
to benefit from the difference betweenwif andw
′i
f . Similarly, the tax cost of a royalty payment is
th − w
r
f + w
′r
f .
Worldwide tax system
Under tax sparing the investor can claim a foreign tax creditqual to the host country statutory tax
rate and notional withholding tax rates, even if the taxes actually paid abroad are lower. The tax costs
of a dividend payment areth−[tf+wdf(1−tf )]+[t
′
f+w
′d
f (1−t
′
f )], whenth > [tf+w
d
f(1−tf )]. When
foreign taxes exceed the home country tax liability, there is no home country tax on the dividend
remittance. In that case, the tax cost of dividend payments corresponds tot′f + w
′d
f (1 − t
′
f). For
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interest and royalties their global tax costs (which are thesame as those of "territorial" investors) are
th − w
i
f + w
′i
f , andth − w
r
f + w
′r
f , respectively. The global tax costs are summarised in Table3.
This discussion of the taxation of worldwide and territorial multinational firms illustrates the fiscal
advantages provided by the tax sparing provision. As summarised by Table 3, under a territorial tax
system, tax sparing has no effect on the tax costs associatedwith the active income earned abroad but
it decreases the tax costs associated with the passive income earned abroad (as long as fiscal incentives
are provided). Under a worldwide tax system, tax sparing decreases both the tax costs associated with
the active and the passive income earned abroad (again, as long as fiscal incentives are provided).
Based on this comparison of global tax costs, tax sparing canbe expected to have a higher effect on
FDI coming from worldwide tax systems as the tax burden is decreased on both the active and the
passive income of investors (when it only affects the passive income of investors from territorial tax
systems). However, as previously discussed, the use of deferral and cross-crediting by investors from
worldwide tax systems can mitigate the burden of residence country taxation on active income. In
that case, the effect of tax sparing on worldwide and territorial investors could be similar, by mainly
affecting the tax burden on passive income.
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Table 3: Global Tax Costs on Active and Passive Income With and Without Tax Sparing
Without tax sparing With tax sparing
If: Global tax cost: If: Global tax cost:
Active income
Dividend payment (territorial) n.a. t′f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ). n.a. t
′
f +w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ).
Dividend payment (worldwide) th > t′f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ) th th > [tf + w
d
f (1− tf )] th − [tf +w
d
f (1− tf )] + [t
′
f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f )]
th < t
′
f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ) t
′
f + w
′d
f (1− t
′
f ) th < [tf + w
d
f (1− tf )] t
′
f +w
′d
f (1− t
′
f )
Passive income
Interest (territorial and worldwide) th > w
′i
f th th > w
i
f th − w
i
f +w
′i
f
th < w
′i
f w
′i
f th < w
i
f w
′i
f
Royalties (territorial and worldwide) th > w
′r
f th th > w
r
f th − w
r
f +w
′r
f
th < w
′r
f w
′r
f th < w
r
f w
′r
f
Note: Withth: home statutory tax rate,tf : foreign statutory tax rate,t
′
f : foreign effective tax rate,w
d
f : nominal dividend withholding tax rate,
w
i
f : nominal interest withholding tax rate,w
r
f : nominal royalties withholding tax rate,w
′d
f : effective dividend withholding tax rate,w
′i
f :
effective interest withholding tax rate,w
′r
f : effective royalties withholding tax rate.
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3 Data and Empirical Specification
Our dataset includes data on bilateral FDI stocks from 23 OECD residence countries in 113 destination
developing countries. The FDI data are obtained from the OECD’s database on FDI stocks (OECD
International Direct Investment Database). There are 34 member countries of the OECD, but we
only use a subset of 23 of these (listed in Table 4) as our residence countries, omitting those OECD
members that are themselves developing or transition economies. This omission is unlikely to affect
the findings, as the 11 omitted OECD residence countries havelimit d outbound FDI,7 and restricts
attention on the impact of tax sparing agreements between developed home countries and developing
host countries (following the focus of the past literature on tax sparing). Following the World Bank’s
classification, destination countries are considered to bedev loping countries if their GDP per capita
is lower than US$12,616 in 2002, corresponding to the beginning of the period of analysis. Note that
none of the 23 OECD residence countries appear as destination countries in our dataset, although the
11 omitted OECD members may appear as destinations where they satisfy this income threshold.
The 23 residence countries are coded as having either worldwide or territorial tax systems, based
on the classification in Markle (2016), as shown in Table 4. This variable is time-varying (although it
is fixed over our sample period for most of the residence countries). Four of the residence countries -
Norway, the U.K., Japan and New Zealand - experienced reforms that moved them from worldwide to
territorial taxation over our sample period. These countries are shown in Table 4 as having undergone
a transition in their tax system, and the year of reform is also noted.
We code tax sparing agreements by searching the text of all existing bilateral tax treaties between
any of the 23 residence countries and any of the 113 source countries for language specifying a tax
sparing provision. Tax treaties are publicly available documents, and are provided in searchable form
by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). We search in particular for the "shall
be deemed to include" language quoted earlier, and for language that is similar in function. Most
tax treaties follow a common format, based on the OECD or UN Model Treaties. It is thus readily
apparent in most cases whether or not the treaty includes a tax sparing provision. As can be seen in
Table 4, all major OECD members, except the United States, have negotiated tax sparing provisions
with tax treaty partners. The number of tax sparing provision signed by OECD countries ranges
7The 11 excluded OECD members are: Chile, the Czech Republic,Estonia, Hungary, Israel, the Republic of Korea,
Mexico, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey.In our dataset, the 23 developed home countries that we use
have a mean outbound FDI stock across all (developed and developing) host countries of $3.7 billion. In contrast, the
majority of the 11 excluded OECD members have mean outbound FDI stocks across all (developed and developing) host
countries of around 1%-2% of that number. A few of the excluded countries (such as the Republic of Korea and Mexico)
have larger outbound FDI stocks, but for none of the 11 excluded countries does the mean outbound FDI stock exceed
14% of the mean for the 23 developed home countries
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between zero for the Unites States and 47 for the United Kingdom. Table 5 presents the number
of tax sparing provisions signed between the 23 OECD countries considered in this analysis and
the host countries of the sample. A large number of developing countries have signed one or more
tax sparing provisions with OECD countries. China, India, Brazil, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand,
Morocco and Vietnam are among the developing countries withthe largest number of tax sparing
provisions. On the other hand, countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Gabon, Suriname, Nicaragua
or Zimbabwe do not have a single tax sparing provision with the 23 OECD residence countries in our
sample. While most tax sparing agreements entered into force prior to 2002, we identify 34 instances
in which new tax sparing agreements entered into force or in which existing tax sparing agreements
were terminated over 2002-2012. Among these 34 changes, 32 occurred after 2002, providing usable
longitudinal variation for our analysis. These changes in tax sparing agreements are listed in Table 6.
The dataset is identified at the country-pair-year level - i.e. each observation represents the FDI
stock held by investors from residence countryi in source countryj in yeart. In principle, the same
country could appear as both a residence and a source country, a d FDI from residence countryi in
source countryj in yeart would represent a separate observation from FDI from residence country
j in source countryi in yeart. However, this does not occur in our data because residence countries
are restricted to be developed and source countries to be developing (using the criterion described
above). These restrictions yield 13,643 observations at the country-pair-year level on 1,941 country-
pairs. With country-pair fixed effects, the baseline estimang sample includes 8,974 observations on
1,176 country-pairs over 2002-2012.8
These bilateral FDI stocks contain a substantial number of zero values, indicating the absence of
any FDI from the residence to the source country in that year.Indeed, 6.5 percent of the observations
- 582 out of 8,974 observations - are zeros. A conventional method for estimating the determinants
of FDI is to use an OLS specification with the log of FDI as the dependent variable. However,
when there are large numbers of zero observations, a fundament l problem with the log function
is that observations for which the FDI value is equal to zero are dropped from the sample. These
observations can be retained in the sample by adding an appropriate constant to these values. However,
this introduces some degree of arbitrariness in the interpretation of magnitudes, depending on the
choice of units. Ideally, the high frequency of zeros with bilateral FDI stocks requires a model that
accommodates zeros and which allows for consistent estimators in the presence of a large number of
zeros. With this type of data, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) suggests the use of a Poisson pseudo-
8With a Poisson fixed effects estimator, if there is only one observation for a country-pair, or if all the observations are
zeros, there is no within country-pair variation and those observations are dropped from the sample. Hence, with fixed
effects, the sample consists of 8,974 observations although the full sample includes 13,643 observations.
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maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator. Poisson models are most familiar in the context of count
data. However, this estimator remains consistent with a continuous dependent variable such as ours
(Winkelmann, 2008; Wooldridge, 2010).9
Our approach to addressing these econometric issues is twofold. First, we use a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood (PPML) fixed effects estimator (with country-pair fixed effects and year effects
in our baseline specification and additional fixed effects inother specifications). Standard errors are
clustered at the country-pair level to address potential correlation of errors. Second, we use a two-part
model (following Egger et al. (2011)), as described below. The baseline equation for the PPML model
is:
FDIijt = exp(βTSijt−1 + γXijt + µij + δt)ǫijt, (1)
whereFDIijt is the stock of FDI from home (residence) countryi in host (source) countryj in year
t. TSijt−1 is a dummy variable which takes the value one if the home country i has a tax sparing
agreement with the host countryj in year t − 1. Tax sparing agreement is one year lagged in the
baseline equation to allow FDI stocks to adjust to a change intax policy.10 In addition, the tax sparing
variable was constructed using the “Date of Entry into Force" of the bilateral tax treaty. However, most
bilateral tax treaties are effective on the taxable year beginning on or after the first day of January of
the calendar year next following the year in which the BTT enters into force. Thus it is reasonable
to expect investors to respond to the signature of tax sparing w th a lag.11 Xijt is a vector of time-
varying residence country, source country, and bilateral ch racteristics. Time-invariant country-pair
characteristics enter the model through the country-pair fixed effectsµij, δt is a vector of time fixed
effects, andǫijt is the multiplicative error term. Due to the inclusion of these fixed effects, the effect
of tax sparing is identified through within-country-pair changes in tax sparing agreements. Thus, U.S.
outbound FDI does not influence the estimation of the tax sparing effect, as the tax sparing variable
does not change for country-pairs for which the U.S. is the residence country.
9For Monte Carlo simulations of the properties of this and various other estimators in the context of gravity models of
bilateral international trade, see Egger and Staub (2016).
10Blonigen and Davies (2000) and Millimet and Kumas (2009) finda lagged effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI
stocks. We also present the estimated results for an immediate effect of tax sparing on FDI stock.
11This lagged effect of treaties is also found in the trade literature when investigating the effect of free trade agreements
on trade (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007).
19
Table 4: Tax System and Tax Sparing in the OECD
Country Tax system Number of Tax Sparing Agreements
Australia Territorial 14
Austria Territorial 17
Belgium Territorial 21
Canada Territorial 39
Denmark Territorial 25
Finland Territorial 28
France Territorial 27
Germany Territorial 22
Greece Worldwide 9
Iceland Territorial 0
Ireland Worldwide 3
Italy Territorial 36
Japan Reform (2009) 18
Luxembourg Territorial 14
Netherlands Territorial 6
New Zealand Reform (2009) 10
Norway Reform (2004) 36
Portugal Territorial 7
Spain Territorial 13
Sweden Territorial 43
Switzerland Territorial 8
United Kingdom Reform (2009) 47
United States Worldwide 0
Notes: Reform corresponds to a tax reform from a worldwide tax
system to a territorial tax system.
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Table 5: Number of Tax Sparing (TS) Provisions Signed with the 23 OECD countries (per Host
Country)
Host country TS Host country TS Host country TS
Afghanistan 0 Guatemala 0 Peru 0
Albania 5 Guinea 0 Philippines 12
Algeria 3 Guyana 2 Poland 3
Angola 0 Honduras 0 Russian Federation 0
Antigua and Barbuda 0 Hungary 0 Rwanda 1
Argentina 10 India 16 Samoa 0
Armenia 1 Indonesia 10 Saudi Arabia 1
Azerbaijan 0 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1 Senegal 0
Bangladesh 8 Iraq 0 Seychelles 0
Barbados 4 Jamaica 8 Sierra Leone 0
Belarus 1 Jordan 0 Slovak Republic 1
Belize 1 Kazakhstan 0 Slovenia 6
Bolivia 1 Kenya 6 South Africa 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 Kyrgyz Republic 0 Sri Lanka 11
Botswana 2 Lao PDR 0 St. Lucia 0
Brazil 11 Latvia 6 Sudan 1
Bulgaria 6 Lebanon 0 Suriname 0
Cambodia 0 Lesotho 1 Swaziland 0
Cameroon 1 Liberia 2 Syrian Arab Republic 0
Chile 0 Lithuania 6 Tanzania 3
China 17 Macedonia, FYR 4 Thailand 11
Colombia 0 Madagascar 0 Trinidad and Tobago 8
Congo, Rep. 0 Malawi 0 Tunisia 10
Costa Rica 0 Malaysia 14 Turkey 14
Cote d’Ivoire 5 Maldives 0 Uganda 1
Croatia 5 Malta 12 Ukraine 2
Cyprus 6 Mauritania 0 Uruguay 0
Czech Republic 2 Mauritius 3 Uzbekistan 0
Dominica 0 Mexico 9 Vanuatu 0
Dominican Republic 1 Moldova 0 Venezuela, RB 6
Ecuador 0 Morocco 12 Vietnam 14
Egypt, Arab Rep. 7 Mozambique 2 Zambia 6
El Salvador 0 Namibia 1 Zimbabwe 0
Equatorial Guinea 0 Nicaragua 0
Estonia 5 Nigeria 5
Ethiopia 1 Oman 0
Fiji 3 Pakistan 10
Gabon 0 Panama 0
Georgia 0 Papua New Guinea 4
Ghana 2 Paraguay 0
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Table 6: Tax Sparing Agreements and Terminations, 2002-201
Home country Host country Tax Sparing Home Country Host Country Tax Sparing
Entry into Force Termination
Portugal Malta 2002 Finland Macedonia, FYR 2002
Luxembourg Trinidad and Tobago 2003 Denmark Poland 2003
Spain Turkey 2003 Denmark Slovenia 2003
Belgium Albania 2004 United Kingdom Malaysia 2005
Italy Mozambique 2004 Austria Poland 2006
Luxembourg Malaysia 2004 Austria Czech Republic 2008
Greece Latvia 2005 Finland Poland 2010
Greece Lithuania 2005 Finland India 2010
Spain Vietnam 2005 Norway Slovenia 2010
Austria Morocco 2006 Finland China 2010
Italy Ethiopia 2006 Norway Turkey 2012
Spain Malaysia 2007 Finland Morocco 2012
Greece Estonia 2008
Spain Jamaica 2008
Italy Saudi Arabia 2009
Belgium Rwanda 2010
Greece Morocco 2010
Greece Tunisia 2010
Canada Turkey 2011
Sweden Mauritius 2012
Switzerland Turkey 2012
United Kingdom Barbados 2012
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3.1 Control Variables
The most common tool to analyse bilateral FDI is the gravity equation based on Newton’s law of
gravity in physics, where the volume of FDI between two countries is proportional to their economic
masses, and inversely proportional to measures of FDI resistance between both countries. The choice
of control variables is thus based on a gravity equation withthe usual main determinants of both
horizontal and vertical FDI as measures of FDI resistance (Markusen, 1984; Helpman, 1984; Brainard,
1997; Yeaple, 2003). Source and destination GDP are included as standard proxies for the size of the
partners’ markets. Population size controls for the effectof host country wealth on FDI since for a
given GDP, a higher population decreases GDP per capita. These variables are from the World Bank
World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Bilateral trde costs, which correspond to symmetric
country-pair trade costs computed by the World Bank using the Inverse Gravity Framework of Novy
(2009), are also included. We control for the corporate tax rate by a measure of the statutory tax rate
differential between the home countryi and the host countryj. The statutory corporate tax rate has a
number of advantages over alternative measures. As emphasised by Overesch and Rincke (2011), it
is the simplest indicator of expected tax payments for firms and it is readily available across countries
and years. Statutory tax rates were compiled primary from the World Tax Database (University of
Michigan) and were supplemented by the OECD, KPMG, and Ernsta d Young Tax Databases when
overlapping data was consistent. Finally, to isolate the eff cts of the territorial tax reforms from
those of the financial crisis (as three out of four tax reformstook place in 2009), we add a home
financial crisis dummy variable which takes the value one if the home country experiences a systemic
banking crisis and the value zero otherwise.12 This variable is from Laeven and Valencia (2012).13
Descriptions and summary statistics for all variables are avail ble in Tables 7 and 8.
12Most of the 23 OECD countries experienced a financial crisis from 2008 which is ongoing in 2012. For the U.K.
and the U.S. the financial crisis starts in 2007. Australia, Cnada, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, and Norway did not
experience a financial crisis for the period 2002-2012.
13An alternative dummy variable for financial crisis has been tested: a dummy variable for host financial crisis taking
the value one if the host country experiences a financial crisis between 2002 and 2012, and the value zero otherwise. In
our sample of 113 destination countries, only Latvia, Hungary, Mongolia, Ukraine and Slovenia experience the ongoing
financial crisis. Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,Uruguay and Slovak Republic experienced a financial crisis at
some point between 2002 and 2005. The remaining countries donot experience a crisis during the period of investigation.
This dummy variable is not statistically significant and it does not alter the results of the analysis.
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Table 7: Summary Statistics
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI stock USD, millions 8974 1828.44 5798.03 0 101030
Ln home GDP Log of GDP in USD 8974 27.62 1.41 23.12 30.42
Ln host GDP Log of GDP in USD 8974 24.89 1.82 19.57 29.74
Ln host population Log of population 8974 16.60 1.87 11.30 21.0
Ln bilateral trade costs Index 8974 4.95 0.47 2.57 6.99
Home financial crisis Binary variable 8974 0.43 0.50 0 1
Tax differential Rate 8974 0.04 0.09 -0.24 0.40
Tax sparingt− 1 Binary variable 8974 0.25 0.44 0 1
Ln distance Log of kilometers 8974 8.44 0.91 4.09 9.78
Colony Binary variable 8974 0.07 0.25 0 1
Common language Binary variable 8974 0.10 0.30 0 1
Bilateral Investment Treaty Binary variable 8974 0.60 0.49 0 1
UN vote correlation Binary variable 8974 0.72 0.19 0 1
Sum of Policy indexes Index 8276 14.48 5.99 -2.00 20.00
Ln FDI conduit Log of USD, millions 8947 7.21 5.22 -1.02 14.71
Ln FDI neighbouring countries Log of USD, millions 8694 6.54 1.71 -6.21 10.47
Bilateral Tax Treaty Binary variable 8974 0.65 0.48 0 1
Tax sparing neighbouring countriest− 1 Mean of binary variables 8974 0.11 0.10 0 0.57
WTR interest Rate 8654 0.11 0.08 0 0.40
WTR royalties Rate 8654 0.12 0.08 0 0.40
GTR interest Rate 8966 0.28 0.08 0 0.42
GTR royalties Rate 8974 0.28 0.08 0 0.42
EATR Rate 6948 0.24 0.07 0 0.41
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Table 8: Description of Variables
Variable Description Source
FDI stocks Bilateral FDI stocks OECD
Ln home GDP GDP World Bank - World Development Indicators
Ln host GDP GDP World Bank - World Development Indicators
Ln population Population size World Bank - World Development Indicators
Ln bilateral trade costs Symmetric country-pair trade costs World Bank
Tax differential Home-country statutory tax rate - host-country statutory tax rate Statutory Corporate Tax Rates werecompiled primary from the World Tax Database (University
of Michigan) and were supplemented by the OECD, KPMG, and Ernst a d Young Tax Databases
when overlapping data was consistent.
Home financial crisis 1 for home country experiencing a systemic banking crisis Laeven and Valencia (2012)
Tax sparing 1 when a tax sparing (TS) provision is included ina bilateral tax treaty Authors calculations based on the reading of bilateral tax treaties provided by the
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
Tax reform 1 when a territorial tax reform is adopted
Ln distance Simple distance between capitals (kms) Head and Mayer (2010)
Colony 1 for pairs ever in colonial relationships Head and Mayer (2010)
Common language 1 for common official of primary language Head and Mayer (2010)
Bilateral investment treaty 1 if a bilateral investment trea y is signed UNCTAD
Correlation of UN votes Bilateral correlation in UN votes Gartzke (1999)
Sum of democracy indices Country-pair sum of democracy indices Polity IV database
Tax sparing neighbouring countries Average number of TS signed between the home countryi and the neighbouring Authors calculations
countries of host countryj
Bilateral tax treaties 1 if a bilateral tax treaty is signed International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation
Ln FDI conduit Sum of FDI from home countryi to OECD countries having a TS with host countryj Authors’ calculations based on OECD data
WTR interest Withholding tax rate on interest Ernst and Young (2012) Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide 2012
WTR royalties Withholding tax rate on royalties Ernst and Young (2012) Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide 2012
GTR interest Global tax rate on interest in the presence of tax holidays (see table 17) Authors’ calculations
GTR royalties Global tax rate on royalties in the presence oftax holidays (see table 17) Authors’ calculations
EATR Difference between the pre-tax and after-tax net-present values Bösenberg and Egger (2017)
of a hypothetical investment in one period.
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4 Estimation Results
4.1 Tax Sparing Provision and FDI
Table 9 presents our baseline regression results, in which bilateral FDI stock is regressed on a tax
sparing dummy variable and a set of control variables derived from a gravity equation for FDI. All
estimations report standard errors clustered at the country-pai level, and include (unreported) year
effects. Country-pair fixed effects are included in Columns1-3 and 6, and home-country fixed effects
and host-country fixed effects are included in Column 5.
Table 9: Tax Sparing and FDI
Exogenous tax sparing Endogenous tax sparing
E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) Pr(tax sparingijt = 1|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.)
Poisson Poisson Poisson First stage probit IV Poisson Poisson
Bilateral tax varying Spatial lag
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Ln home GDP 0.618a 0.578a 0.035 0.634 0.575a
(0.170) (0.183) (0.023) (0.481) (0.181)
Ln host GDP 0.568a 0.606a 0.026 0.643a 0.584a
(0.091) (0.088) (0.021) (0.112) (0.094)
Ln host population -1.063c -0.935 0.192a -0.103 -0.816
(0.618) (0.592) (0.022) (0.604) (0.683)
Bilateral trade costs -0.035 -0.088 -0.260a -1.141a -0.066
(0.118) (0.107) (0.052) (0.166) (0.104)
Home financial crisis -0.112a -0.113b -0.304a -0.149a -0.084b
(0.041) (0.044) (0.058) (0.049) (0.040)
Tax differential 0.463 0.795b -1.636a 1.239a 0.335
(0.429) (0.363) (0.252) (0.467) (0.419)
Tax sparingt− 1 0.579a 0.622a 0.611a 0.677c 0.672a
(0.195) (0.177) (0.177) (0.402) (0.195)
Ln distance 0.119a -0.509a
(0.027) (0.097)
Colony 0.159c 0.450b
(0.083) (0.186)
Common language 0.334a 0.701a
(0.077) (0.201)
Bilateral Investment Treaty 0.111 -0.007 -0.022
(0.077) (0.040) (0.116)
UN vote correlation -0.376 1.578a 0.126
(0.280) (0.180) (0.401)
Sum of Polity indexes 0.005 0.001 0.003
(0.010) (0.003) (0.008)
Tax sparing neighbouring countries 5.630a
(0.206)
Ln FDI neighbouring countriest 0.040
(0.039)
Ln FDI neighbouring countriest− 1 0.027
(0.044)
Country pair fixed effects X X X X
Home country fixed effects X
Host country fixed effects X
Observations 10,619 8,974 8,276 8,276 8,276 7,027
Notes: The letters “a", “b" and “c" indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent.
Standard errors, which are clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses and time effects are
included.
26
There is clear evidence of a positive relationship between tax sparing and the FDI stock. In
Column (1), we start with a simple model where the effect of tax sparing provisions on FDI is tested
with country-pair fixed effects only. The coefficient of 0.58is statistically significant at the one
percent level. In Column (2), we include usual covariates based on the gravity equation for FDI as
discussed in section 3.14 The impact of the inclusion of these covariates on the magnitude of the
coefficient estimated on tax sparing is quite modest. This coeffi ient reaches a magnitude of 0.62
and remains statistically significant at the one percent level. As the Poisson specification takes an
exponential form, the percentage impact of tax sparing on FDI corresponds to 100[exp(0.62) - 1].
Thus, the estimated coefficient implies that the inclusion of a tax sparing provision in a bilateral tax
treaty increases FDI from the signatory country by 86 percent. This result is comparable to (although
somewhat smaller than) the previous results of Hines (2001)and Azémar et al. (2007), who find that
the volume of Japanese FDI is 1.4-2.4 times larger, and 2.8 times larger in countries with which Japan
has tax sparing provisions, respectively.
The signing of tax sparing agreements is potentially endogen us. Unfortunately, there is no quasi-
experimental variation in the signing or termination of taxsparing agreements that can fully address
this concern. However, we use a number of different strategies to seek to rule out possible alter-
native explanations of this nature and to move (albeit cautiously) towards a causal interpretation of
the baseline result. The first potential source of endogeneity bias is from omitted variables. Even
in the presence of country-pair fixed effects, time varying omitted variables may cause bias. The
determination of the correlation between the error term,ǫijt, and tax sparing requires to consider the
determinants of the inclusion of a tax sparing provision in abil teral tax treaty. No empirical work
has examined the determinants of tax sparing provisions. However, since tax sparing is arguably a
form of aid aiming to promote economic development, its determinants should be similar to those
of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Development economists have examined empirically for
many years the determinants of ODA. These determinants are summarised by Clist (2011) with the
introduction of a 4P framework - Poverty, Population, Policy, and Proximity - which encapsulates
the various forms of aid allocation practice. An important question is whether the unobserved deter-
minants of FDI are associated with the probability of signina tax sparing provision. For instance,
unobserved conflicts and instability in a host country that inhibit British FDI would causeǫijt to be
14These control variables have the expected signs and they aregenerally statistically significant across the regressions.
Their inclusion in the baseline model is thus warranted. Both home and host GDP have a positive effect on FDI stock.
The negative sign of the coefficient estimated on populationindicates that higher income per capita in the source country
tends to increase FDI. Bilateral trade costs, which impede intra-firm trade, decreases FDI. Home countries affected by
the financial crisis experience a decrease in their FDI outflows. Finally, the bilateral difference in the statutory tax rtes
increases FDI.
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negative. The probability of signing a tax sparing provision with a vulnerable country might be high
if in addition to supporting the fragile state, there is an expected gain for the U.K. in compensating
its British multinational firms abroad for an increase in thecost of doing business and in uncertainty.
Thus tax sparing and conflicts/instability may be positively correlated, but the FDI equation error
term ǫijt and conflicts/instability may be negatively correlated. Inthat case, tax sparing andǫijt are
negatively correlated, and the coefficient on tax sparing will tend to beunderestimated. On the other
hand, an unobserved increase in a source country’s saliencen th U.K., such as cooperative diplo-
matic relations, may both lead to the U.K. signing a tax sparing agreement with that source country
and British MNCs investing more heavily in that country. In tha case, tax sparing andǫijt could be
positively correlated, and the coefficient on tax sparing will tend to beoverestimated.
To address omitted variable bias, we first add a set of time-varying controls for bilateral economic
ties and political affinity which could both explain the signature of tax sparing provision and an
increase in FDI, such as a dummy for a bilateral investment traty, a measure of bilateral correlation
in UN votes (from Gartzke (1999)), and, as in Martin et al. (201 ), the country-pair sum of democracy
indices from the Polity IV database. In Column (3), these thre bilateral time-varying controls are
included in the model. Their coefficients are not significantly different from zero and the coefficient
estimated on the tax sparing variable, 0.61, is not altered by their inclusion.
Second, we use a treatment effect model that (following Egger et al. (2011)) takes account of the
potential endogeneity of tax sparing agreements. The first stage involves predicting the probability of
signing a tax sparing agreement using a variable that arguably does not directly affect bilateral FDI.
This is essentially equivalent to an instrumental variables (IV) strategy. In particular, we instrument
a tax sparing provision between the home countryi and the host countryj in t− 1, with the average
number of tax sparing provisions signed between the same home countryi and the neighbouring
countries of the host countryj in t − 1, Zijt. The neighbouring countries correspond to the other
countries of the same geographical region.15 The economic rationale for this instrument stems from
the idea that multinational firms tend to follow a “sequential location decision”, where they first decide
in which region to locate and then in which country (Davies and Voget, 2008). Tax competition to
attract FDI is thus expected to be regional. A recipient developing country might be more likely to
sign a tax sparing provision with a home country if neighbouring countries have signed this provision
with the same home country, to allow firms to benefit from fiscalincentives within their boundaries as
well as in neighbouring countries. This suggests that tax spring provisions signed by neighbouring
15Following the World Bank classification, the developing countries of our sample belong to six regions: East Asia and
Pacific, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe Central
Asia.
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countries can influence tax sparing provisions signed by a host c untryj. However, tax sparing
provisions signed by the neighbouring countries of countryj should arguably not have a direct effect
on the location of FDI in the countryj.
By viewing tax sparing as potentially endogenous, we allow fr a possible correlation between
the error termǫijt of Equation (1) and the likelihood of signing a tax sparing agreement. As in Egger
et al. (2011) with respect to the trade effects of preferential tax agreements, our instrumental variable
strategy involves allowing a binary variable to be endogenous within a Poisson pseudo-maximum
likelihood estimation. We use a treatment effect model and implement a two-step instrumental vari-
able procedure (Wooldridge, 2010). First, we estimate a probit binary response model of tax sparing
on the instrumental variable and the other controls. From the probit model, we compute the fitted
probabilities (̂Gijt). Second, we use the IV Poisson GMM estimator, instrumentingtax sparing with
the fitted probabilities (̂Gijt) from the previous step. This method has the advantage of being fully
robust to misspecification of the probit model, and the standard errors are asymptotically valid and
do not need to be adjusted for the first-stage probit (Wooldridge, 2010). We assume the following
reduced-form equation forTSijt:
TSijt =



1 if Zijtφ+ vijt ≥ 0,
0 otherwise,
whereZijt is a vector of variables affecting a countryi’s likelihood to sign a tax sparing agreement
with a countryj. Zijt contains all the variables ofXijt as well as the instrumental variable “tax sparing
of neighbouring countries". There is endogeneity if the errorsvijt andǫijt are not independent.
In Column (5), we report the coefficients, and their robust standard errors, estimated with the IV
Poisson GMM model with tax sparing instrumented by (Ĝijt).16 The results of the first-stage probit
model are reported in Column (4). They indicate that the averag number of tax sparing provisions
signed by neighbouring countries has a positive effect on tax sp ring, with a coefficient that is statis-
tically significant at the one percent level. As required, the instrument has an effect on the probability
of signing a tax sparing agreement.17 The other results indicate that selection into tax sparing is posi-
tively affected by the proximity with the host country. Indeed, the probability of signing a tax sparing
16With IV Poisson, the GMM estimator is used to solve a minimisation problem to make the sample-moment conditions
as close to zero as possible. With this model, adding country-pair fixed effects is technically not feasible and from an
econometric perspective, could lead to an incidental parameter problem. Home country fixed effects and host country
fixed effects along with bilateral time invariant variables(such as distance, common language and colony) are thus used
with IV Poisson GMM instead of the country-pair fixed effects. To make the results comparable, the IV is performed with
the same sample as when country-pair fixed effects are included.
17In interpreting the coefficient estimated on "tax sparing neighbouring countries", note that the variable ranges from
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agreement increases when the host country has a common language, was a former colony, and has
low bilateral trade costs. Those proximity factors also have positive effect on FDI, implying that
country-pairs with cultural and economic ties select into tax sparing and higher FDI. However, some
factors have opposite effects on selection into tax sparingand on FDI such as the GDP per capita and
the corporate tax rate. FDI is attracted by countries with higher income per capita (positive sign on
host GDP and negative sign on population) and low corporate tax rates, while the probability of sign-
ing a tax sparing agreement increases with the needs of the host country (positive sign on population)
and with good macro-economic policies (ability to generatefiscal receipts).
The coefficient estimated on the endogenous tax sparing in Column (5) is qualitatively similar
to the one estimated in Column (2) when tax sparing was treated s exogenous. Its magnitude of
0.68 indicates that the volume of FDI received by tax sparingcountries is 97 percent larger than
nonsparing countries ([exp(0.68)−1]). This result should be interpreted with caution though, because
the validity of the exclusion restriction (that tax sparingagreements in neighbouring countries do not
affect a country’s own inbound FDI) may be questionable. Forinstance, there may be a priori reasons
- related to complementarities across neighbouring countries - that FDI in neighbouring countries
(which is influenced by tax sparing in neighbouring countries) may affect FDI in countryi. Even
so, we might still expect tax sparing among neighbours to be less subject to endogeneity concerns
than a host country’s own tax sparing agreements. Since the signature of tax sparing by neighbouring
countries can generate some reorganisation of FDI in the host countryj, we include a FDI spatial lag
in Column (6). This spatial lag corresponds to a measure of average FDI from a similar home country
to the neighbouring countries of the host country. The result indicates that there is no substitution or
complementary relationships between FDI from a home country i to a host countryj and FDI from
the same home countryi to the neighbouring countries of the host countryj in yeart or in yeart−1.18
This result tends to support the validity of our instrument si ce the assumption of exclusion restriction
cannot be rejected.
Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), our second approachto address potential endogeneity of
tax sparing is by including home-country by time and host-country by time fixed effects in addition
to the country-pair fixed effects. This rich set of fixed effects absorbs the covariates tested in our
0 to 0.57 in magnitude (see Table 7: Summary Statistics). With a probit model, the coefficient estimated of 5.6 indicates
that each one-unit increase in tax sparing neighbouring countries increases the probit index by 5.6 standard deviations.
18As for the measure of the IV, the neighbouring countries correspond to the other countries of the same geographical
region (following the World Bank classification). Since we use an average of FDI in neighbouring countries, less than 0.5
percent of the observations have zero values. The log of FDI can be used to estimate an elasticity. A similar insignificant
result is obtained when FDI in neighbouring countries is in leve (with a coefficient estimated of 1.23E-06 due to the scale
of FDI), or when FDI in neighbouring countries is instrumented using simple averages of neighbouring countries’ FDI
determinants. These unreported results are available uponrequest.
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baseline gravity equation, and so these covariates are excluded from the specification. In Column (1)
of Table 10, the PPML estimation results with home and host country by time fixed effects suggest
that the coefficient estimated on tax sparing is positive andstatistically significant at the one percent
level. However, with a magnitude of 0.43, it has a smaller magnitude than the coefficient estimated
with the IV approach (0.68). It is also smaller than the coefficient estimated with the assumption of
exogeneity in Table 9 (0.62). The estimated coefficient on tax sparing reported in Column (1) suggests
that, ceteris paribus, the inclusion of a tax sparing provisi n in bilateral tax treaties leads to an average
increase of about 100*[exp(0.43) - 1]=54 percent in FDI fromthe signatory country.
Table 10: Tax Sparing and FDI with Country-Pair Fixed and Country-and-Time Effects
E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Tax sparingt+ 2 -0.033 -0.018
(0.053) (0.052)
Tax sparingt+ 1 -0.014
(0.046)
Tax sparingt 0.300c 0.210 0.271c
(0.160) (0.148) (0.161)
Tax sparingt− 1 0.428a 0.356a 0.421a 0.329a
(0.135) (0.103) (0.137) (0.098)
Tax sparingt− 2 0.149
(0.094)
Country pair fixed effects x x x x x
Home country by time fixed effects x x x x x
Host country by time fixed effects x x x x x
Observations 10,594 11,503 10,594 10,594 9,486
Overall tax sparing effect 0.749a
(0.208)
Notes: The letters “a", “b" and “c" indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent. Standard
errors, which are clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses and time effects are included.
In Column (2), we test the contemporaneous effect of tax sparing on FDI. The coefficient estimated
on tax sparingt is positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent leve . This suggests an
immediate response of investors to the change in tax policy even if they will fully benefit from this
change in the following tax year (since BTTs are generally effective from the 1st January of the year
following the date of entry into force). However, this coefficient has a smaller magnitude and a lower
statistical significance than the one estimated on lagged tax sp ring. In Column (3), when tax sparing
t and tax sparingt− 1 are tested together, tax sparingt is no longer statistically significant when tax
sparingt − 1 remains statistically significant at the one percent level.Those results suggest a lagged
effect of tax sparing on the stock of FDI.
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An important concern with the results in Columns (1)-(3) is the possibility of pre-existing trends.
Residence countries may, for instance, negotiate tax sparing p ovisions only with source countries
receiving increasing amounts of FDI. Following Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Wooldridge (2010) and
Yotov et al. (2016), a test for the “strict" exogeneity of taxsparing can be performed by including
a lead variable that captures the future level of tax sparing, to the specification with home and host
countries by time and bilateral fixed effects. This allows usto test whether future tax sparing agree-
ments (i.e. those not yet in force) seem to drive the result, and hence whether pre-existing trends are
a concern. If tax sparing causes FDI but not vice versa, the leads should not be statistically different
from zero.
In Column (4) of Table 10, tax sparingt + 2 is added to the basic model. In Column (5), two
leads are added, tax sparingt + 1 and tax sparingt + 2 along with the contemporaneous effect and
two lagged effects,t − 1 and t − 2. The coefficients estimated on the tax sparing leads are not
statistically different from zero and they are small (essentially zero) in magnitude, suggesting that
tax sparing leads FDI growth and not the opposite. These results are inconsistent with a pre-existing
trend of increasing FDI between countries that sign tax sparing agreements. Instead, the negative
sign of the coefficient estimated on the leads might suggest that firms delay investment temporarily in
anticipation of a coming BTT. All in all, these results appear consistent with a causal interpretation of
the estimated effect of tax sparing agreements.
The lags included in Column (5) capture the possibility thatthe effects of tax sparing change
over time. The results show an increasing effect from the year of doption to the next year, with a
decreasing effect on the second year. Note that the period ofanalysis corresponds to ten years and
thus, it restricts the number of lags that can be used when a change is close to 2002. In addition,
these coefficients are strongly correlated and this multicollinearity makes it difficult to estimate the
incidence of corporate taxes at each lag. The magnitude of 0.75 of the estimated overall tax sparing
effect (reported at the bottom of Table 10), is strong and statistically significant at the one percent
level, suggesting that the positive effect of tax sparing onFDI lasts for more than one year following
the adoption of the provision. Note that the magnitude of thetotal effect, 0.75, is in line with the
magnitude obtained with IV, 0.68. This is likely because, inthe absence of country-pair fixed effects,
the latter coefficient tends to capture the long term effect associated with tax sparing provisions which
have been in force for a long time (including, but not only, pre-sample tax sparing provisions).
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4.2 Tax Sparing and the Intensive and Extensive Margins of FDI
Our bilateral FDI stock variable contains 6.5 percent of zeros. Those zeros correspond to the absence
of FDI stock on a particular year between two countries when FDI is observed for other years during
the period of analysis. The inclusion of country-pair fixed effects excludes from the analysis country-
pairs with no FDI for the entire sample period. Without excluding the non-FDI country pairs, the
amount of zeros would reach 38 percent of the observations. This mass-point at zero in either case
makes it interesting to apply a two-part model to decompose the effects of tax sparing on FDI and
investigate their effects on the extensive margin of FDI, i.e. the number of country pairs for which FDI
starts due to tax sparing, and the effect of tax sparing on thein ensive margin of FDI, i.e. the extend to
which tax sparing increases FDI between country pairs with already established multinational firms.
The two-part model has the advantage of allowing us to estimate separately the probability of
investing in a foreign country -Pr(FDI > 0) -, and the expected volume of investment in a foreign
country,E(FDI|FDI > 0). The former is estimated by logit and conditional logit models and the
latter is estimated by Poisson PML. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 11 give parameters and standard
errors when home-country and host-country fixed effects, and country-pair fixed effects are included,
respectively. The methodology used in Column (1) allows theinclusion in the dataset of country-pairs
with no FDI at all for the entire period of analysis, leading to a number of observations that is higher
than when focusing on aggregate FDI with country-pair fixed effects in Table 9 and 10. The coefficient
estimated on tax sparing suggests that the binary decision ab ut FDI participation is not influenced
by the inclusion of this provision in bilateral tax treaties. A similar result is obtained when, by using
conditional logit to include country-pair fixed effects, wefocus solely on the country-pairs starting
to engage in FDI.19 Note that this sub-sample corresponds exactly to the sub-sample we would like
to focus on when decomposing the total effect of tax sparing as measured in Table 9 and 10 (with
country-pair fixed effects), into the contributions from the extensive margin of FDI. Columns (3) and
(4) display the results on the intensive margin of FDI with tax sparing when bilateral fixed-effects
are included (Column 3) and when home-country by time and host-c untry by time fixed-effects are
included (Column 4). The coefficient estimated on tax sparing is positive and statistically significant
at the one percent level. Its magnitude corresponds to the magnitude estimated on total FDI. All in
all, the results in Table 11 suggest that tax sparing has an impact on the intensive margin, but does
not significantly influence the extensive margin of FDI. The co fficient estimated on tax sparing with
the intensive margin accounts for the entire effect of tax sparing. Interestingly, this results is in line
19Conditional logit differs from the regular logit regression in that data are grouped and the maximum likelihood is
calculated relative to each country-pair.
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with Egger et al. (2011) when investigating the effects of prefe ential trade agreements on the trade
margins.
4.3 Home Country Tax Systems
Worldwide and Territorial Tax Systems
The previous literature has not investigated the question of whether the effect of tax sparing agree-
ments differs across worldwide and territorial source countries. In Column (1) of Table 12, we add
to the specification which treats tax sparing as exogenous, an interaction between our tax sparing
variable and a (time-varying) indicator for worldwide residence countries (we also include the latter
variable separately). The coefficient estimated on the interac ion term is statistically insignificant.
However, the magnitude of this coefficient in absolute valuecorresponds to about one third of the
coefficient estimated on tax sparing. The non-significance of the interaction term does not exclude
the possibility that tax sparing may have a higher effect on FDI from territorial tax systems than from
worldwide tax systems. Since endogeneity can lead to this confli ting result, in Column (1’) we es-
timate this interaction term with country-pairs, home by time and host by time fixed effects. The
coefficient is still not statistically significant but with avery small magnitude, clearly indicating that
there is no significant difference in the estimated effect oftax sparing across worldwide and territorial
home countries.
Some territorial source countries limit the exemption of dividends paid by foreign affiliates to
their parents to affiliates located in selected countries. Thus, those countries operate a hybrid system
of international taxation, where exemption takes place with some countries while the income earned
in other countries is subject to taxation. Six of our source countries have a hybrid tax system, namely:
Canada, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Portugal. As shown in Table 13, these hybrid tax
systems limit the eligibility of foreign affiliates exemption to bilateral tax treaty countries, to countries
with tax information exchange agreement, to EU member countries, to EEA member countries or to
countries with an effective corporate tax rate of at least 10.5 percent.20 To take into account the
fact that some countries can have both a territorial and a world ide tax system, we build a dummy
variable "hybrid worldwide tax system" which takes the value one when foreign affiliates are located
in a country in which they are not eligible for exemption by the ome country. This variable is then
interacted with the dummy tax sparing. The interaction terms "worldwide tax system x tax sparingt−
20See the report "Evolution of Territorial Tax Systems in the OECD" prepared by PriceWaterhouseCooper (PriceWa-
terhouseCoopers, 2013) and Smart (2010) focusing on Canada, for information on hybrid tax systems.
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Table 11: Tax Sparing, Intensive and Extensive Margin of FDI
Pr(FDI>0) Pr(FDI>0) E(FDI|FDI>0) E(FDI|FDI>0)
Logit Conditional Logit Poisson Poisson
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Ln home GDP 2.853a 1.726 0.619a
(0.738) (1.059) (0.170)
Ln host GDP 0.915b 0.302 0.568a
(0.430) (0.741) (0.091)
Ln host population -5.593b -11.127b -1.066c
(2.429) (4.526) (0.619)
Bilateral trade costs -2.320a -0.571 -0.034
(0.409) (0.730) (0.118)
Home financial crisis -1.098a -1.251a -0.110a
(0.264) (0.445) (0.041)
Tax differential -1.962 -4.316 0.485
(1.837) (3.224) (0.429)
Ln distance -3.553a
(0.429)
Colony 3.364a
(1.277)
Common language 1.163b
(0.463)
Bilateral Investment Treaty 0.476b
(0.239)
UN vote correlation -1.674
(1.140)
Sum of Polity indexes -0.019
(0.037)
Tax sparingt− 1 0.161 -0.209 0.621a 0.423a
(0.317) (0.910) (0.178) (0.133)
Country pair fixed effects x x x
Home country fixed effects x
Host country fixed effects x
Home country by time fixed effects x
Host country by time fixed effects x
Observations 11,598 1,364 8,338 9,686
Notes: The letters “a", “b" and “c" indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent.
Standard errors, which are clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses and time effects are
included.
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1" and "hybrid worldwide tax system x tax sparingt−1" are highly correlated (0.97) though. Indeed,
the observations of both interaction terms are only changing between 6 country-pairs: Greece-Latvia,
Greece-Lithuania, Greece-Slovenia, Portugal-China, Portugal-India, Portugal-Tunisia. Greece and
Portugal have a territorial tax system with EU members (for both) and with EEA members, Portuguese
speaking African countries, and East Timor (for Portugal).Greece, which mainly has a worldwide
tax system switches to territoriality with EU members and ithas a tax sparing agreement with the
EU members Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. Portugal, whichas a territorial system switches to a
worldwide tax system with three countries with which it has atax sparing agreement: China, India
and Tunisia (see Table 13). The other observations remain unchanged since Iceland does not have
tax sparing provisions included in BTTs, Luxembourg only has tax sparing provisions with countries
having an effective corporate tax rate higher than 10.5 percent, and for Canada and Finland, tax
sparing can only be associated with a territorial tax systemand never with a worldwide tax system.
Indeed, a tax sparing provision only exists if there is a bilater l tax treaty in place.
The results obtained in Column (2) (with country-pair fixed effects) and in Column (2’) (with
home country by time, host country by time and country-pair fixed effects) are almost identical to the
ones obtained in Columns (1) and (1’). The results suggest that there is not statistically significant
difference in the responsiveness of FDI from territorial and worldwide tax systems, and this even
when taking into account that the tax system of the home country can vary with the country-pair.
The apparent absence of a stronger effect for worldwide homecountries is consistent with a sce-
nario in which the ability of worldwide MNCs to average theirincome and income tax rate21 (cross-
crediting) and to defer the repatriation of dividends out ofactive income from their foreign affiliates
to their parent substantially mitigates the burden of residnce country taxation. Suppose that a world-
wide MNC in a host country that offers tax incentives reinvests all of its active business earnings.
Then, as it does not pay dividends to its parent, the parent does n t face a home country tax on this in-
come and conversely does not benefit from the tax credit offered by the home country for taxes spared
by the host country. If the repatriation of dividends is deferred forever, the value of tax sparing for
worldwide MNCs (where it applies to both active and passive income) would tend to converge to that
for territorial MNCs (where it applies only to passive income). Even if the MNC lacks profitable op-
portunities for reinvestment in its business activities inthe host country, Weichenrieder (1996) shows
theoretically that it can benefit from deferral by reinvesting ts active earnings in passive assets.
21As discussed in Section 2, by averaging foreign tax liabilities, this method allows ‘excess credit’ investors to benefit
from the foreign tax incentive provided in other jurisdictions.
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Table 12: Territorial Tax Reforms, Tax Sparing and FDI
E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
[1] [1’] [2] [2’] [3] [3’]
Ln home GDP 0.589a 0.585a 0.586a
(0.175) (0.175) (0.176)
Ln host GDP 0.550a 0.550a 0.548a
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Ln host population -1.061c -1.059c -1.045c
(0.613) (0.613) (0.612)
Bilateral trade costs -0.043 -0.042 -0.042
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119)
Home financial crisis -0.086b -0.087b -0.085b
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Tax differential 0.414 0.411 0.410
(0.437) (0.437) (0.437)
Tax sparingt− 1 0.643a 0.427a 0.649a 0.427a 0.609a 0.429a
(0.184) (0.140) (0.183) (0.140) (0.178) (0.135)
Worldwide tax system x Tax sparing t-1 -0.224 -0.002
(0.147) (0.151)
Worldwide tax system 0.101
(0.138)
Hybrid worldwide tax system x Tax sparingt − 1 -0.233 -0.002
(0.145) (0.151)
Hybrid worldwide tax system 0.111
(0.136)
Territorial tax reform x Tax sparingt− 1 0.233 0.004
(0.148) (0.167)
Territorial tax reform -0.106
(0.137)
Country pair fixed effects X X X X X X
Home country by time fixed effects X X X
Host country by time fixed effects X X X
Observations 8,974 10,594 8,974 0.992 8,974 10,594
Notes: The letters “a", “b" and “c" indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent.
Standard errors, which are clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses and time effects are
included.
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Table 13: Hybrid Tax Systems
Hybrid tax systems Countries of for-
eign affiliates eligi-
ble for exemption
No changes:
worldwide x tax
spring t − 1 =
hybrid worldwide
x tax sparingt− 1
Changes: worldwide x
tax spring t-1 6= hybrid
worldwide x tax sparing
t− 1
Canada Bilateral tax treaty
countries and coun-
tries with which
Canada has signed
a tax information
exchange.
No changes as if
there is no BTT in
place, there is no
tax sparing provi-
sion.
Finland EU member coun-
tries and treaty
countries.
No changes as if
there is no BTT in
place, there is no
tax sparing provi-
sion.
Greece EU member coun-
tries only.
Greece has a tax sparing
agreement with the EU
members: Latvia, Lithua-
nia and Slovenia. Div-
idends repatriated from
these countries are ex-
empt from taxation in
Greece.
Iceland EU member coun-
tries and OECD
member countries.
No changes be-
cause Iceland has
zero tax sparing
agreement.
Luxembourg All countries with
an effective tax rate
of at least 10.5 per-
cent.
No changes be-
cause tax sparing
agreements are
signed with coun-
tries having an
EATR higher than
10.5 percent.
Portugal EU and EEA
member countries
and Portuguese
speaking African
countries and East
Timor.
Portugal has a tax sparing
agreement with the non-
EU and non-EEA mem-
bers: China, India and
Tunisia. Dividends repa-
triated from these coun-
tries are taxed in Portugal.
Source: PriceWaterhouseCooper (2013). 38
There is abundant empirical evidence that worldwide MNCs defer the repatriation of dividends
to avoid home country taxation. For example, in 2004 the U.S.Congress enacted a measure that
permitted U.S. MNCs to repatriate foreign income at a very low U.S. tax rate for a one-year period.
This prompted a massive increase in repatriations (Dharmapala et al., 2011). Egger et al. (2015) find
that following the U.K.’s territorial tax reform in 2009, U.K -owned affiliates significantly increased
repatriations, relative to a matched control group of non-U.K.-owned affiliates. This suggests that
U.K. MNCs were deferring the repatriation of dividends under the worldwide regime, which would
imply that the benefits of tax sparing with regard to active income and dividend payments would be
attenuated.22
Territorial Tax Reforms
In Columns (3) and (3’), we introduce into the basic specification an interaction between our tax
sparing variable and an indicator for tax reforms that transformed four of the residence countries in
our sample - Norway in 2004 and the U.K., Japan and New Zealandin 2009 - from worldwide to ter-
ritorial systems (we also include the tax reform variable separately).23 Recall that this interaction term
captures an arguably quasi-exogenous source of variation as territorial reforms (driven primarily by
concerns extraneous to developing countries) change the valu of pre-existing tax sparing agreements.
If tax sparing is differentially valuable for worldwide MNCs, we would expect that these territorial
reforms would induce (in relative terms) a reallocation of FDI from sparing to nonsparing countries.
As argued above, a difference-in-differences estimate of this effect can reasonably be given a causal
interpretation, as the value of pre-existing tax sparing agreements would be exogenously reduced.
However, the estimated effect is not statistically significant.
Taken together, the results (or lack thereof) in Table 12 point t wards a conclusion that much of the
benefit from tax sparing is also available to territorial MNCs. There is no strong evidence to suggest
22A related comment is that, under a worldwide tax system, the signature of a tax sparing provision is expected to
increase the repatriation of dividends of the investors benefiti g from the provision. By granting a tax credit for taxes
that would ordinarily have been due to the home country, tax sparing reduces the tax faced at home when the income
is repatriated. Since OECD FDI statistics corresponds to all cross-border transactions between firms which belong to
the same group, such as equity capital, intra-company loans, interest income, and reinvested earnings, an increase in th
repatriation of dividends might lead to a decrease in the reinvested earnings component of FDI. The potential increase in
equity and intra-company loans in response to the signatureof tax sparing might thus be mitigated by the repatriation of
dividends for investors subject to a worldwide tax system. Since tax sparing is not expected to influence the repatriation
of dividends of territorial investors, this could also explain why a similar elasticity is estimated between worldwideand
territorial FDI with respect to tax sparing.
23Note that these reforms were not accompanied by changes in tax sparing agreements. As indicated in Table 6, during
the period of investigation, the U.K. has terminated a tax sparing provision with Malaysia four years before the reform
and has signed a tax sparing provision with Barbados three years after. Norway, which reform took place in 2004, has
terminated a tax sparing provision with Slovenia in 2012 andwith Turkey in 2012.
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that the effect on FDI of signing tax sparing agreements is greater for worldwide home countries.
In the same vein, the territorial tax reforms of Japan, the U.K., New Zealand and Norway did not
substantially reduce FDI from those countries to source countries with which they have tax sparing
agreements, relative to source countries with which they donot have tax sparing agreements. In other
words, these reforms, which exempt the foreign income of their multinational firms from taxation
at home, do not seem to have reduced the importance of tax sparing agreements with developing
countries. These results are consistent with each other, asa territorial tax reform corresponds to a
within-residence-country change from a worldwide to a territorial tax system. This reinforces the
continuing relevance of tax sparing in a world in which most re idence countries are territorial.
It is also worth commenting briefly on the implications of these results for the U.S., which is a
major source of outbound FDI but has no tax sparing agreements. Our basic results suggest that U.S.
FDI in developing countries may thus be lower than would otherwise be the case. The aggregate FDI
statistics are broadly consistent with this implication. For instance, in 2012 (the last year of our sample
period), the aggregate stock of U.S. FDI in developing countries was about 11% of that in developed
countries. In contrast, Japan (another major source of FDI,which has an extensive network of tax
sparing agreements) had an aggregate stock of FDI in developing countries in 2012 that was about
32% of that in developed countries. When we consider all of the ot er (non-U.S.) resident countries
of our sample having a network of tax sparing agreements, in total heir aggregate stock of FDI in
developing countries in 2012 was about 20% of that in developed countries. Our results on territorial
tax reforms suggest that the recent U.S. territorial reform(e.g. Dharmapala (2018)) is unlikely to
change this situation since worldwide MNC seem to already benefit from foreign low tax rates on
their active income (with cross-crediting and deferral). In addition, the U.S. territorial tax reform
has been accompanied by a substantial decrease in the corporate tax rate, which should mitigate the
incentive to locate in developing countries for tax considerations. For instance, with a decrease from
35% to 21 %, the new U.S. corporate tax rate is below the average corporate tax rate of the developing
countries of the sample (25% in 2012).
4.4 Tests for Alternative Explanations
Bilateral Tax Treaties
As tax sparing agreements are provisions included in bilateral ax treaties (BTT), not controlling
for BTT raises the question of whether we are measuring the effect of tax sparing on FDI or the
effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI. From a theoretical point of view, BTT could have a positive
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influence on FDI as they alleviate double taxation, offer lower ithholding tax rates, and provide
information about how the firms will be taxed which can reassure investors (Davies, 2004). However,
this assumption is not supported by the data. Most empiricalan yses find no statistically significant
effect of BTTs on FDI (Louie and Rousslang, 2002; Blonigen and Davies, 2004), and when the effect
is significant it is negative rather than positive (Egger et al., 2006).24 These results can be explained by
the fact that double taxation is already alleviated unilaterally by most countries and lower withholding
tax rates on interest and royalties are offset by home country taxation. In addition, as one of the
objectives of the signature of BTTs is to facilitate the exchange of information in order to reduce tax
avoidance and evasion, BTTs could have a detrimental effecton FDI.
On average the OECD countries of our sample include a tax sparing p ovision in 31 percent of
their BTTs with developing countries,25 indicating that tax sparing and BTT do not overlap in a large
number of instances. While most of the BTTs entered into force prior to 2002, we observe 293
instances in which new BTTs entered into force or in which existing BTTs were terminated over
2002-2012.
24See Davies (2004) for a survey on tax treaties and FDI.
25This average is 33 percent if we remove the United States and Iceland from the calculation. Both countries never
include a tax sparing provision in their BTTs.
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Table 14: Bilateral Tax Treaties and Treaty Shopping
The role of BTTs Treaty shopping The role of BTTs Treaty shopping
E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Ln home GDP 0.618a 0.616a 0.613a 0.604a
(0.170) (0.170) (0.170) (0.171)
Ln host GDP 0.568a 0.569a 0.570a 0.562a
(0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091)
Ln host population -1.063c -1.013 -1.088c -0.044
(0.618) (0.620) (0.617) (0.119)
Bilateral trade costs -0.035 -0.039 -0.025 -0.106b
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.041)
Home financial crisis -0.112a -0.112a -0.113a -1.222c
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.637)
Tax differential 0.463 0.456 0.447 0.455
(0.429) (0.429) (0.430) (0.429)
Tax sparingt− 1 0.622a 0.703a 0.614a 0.428a 0.453a 0.429a
(0.177) (0.205) (0.179) (0.135) (0.148) (0.131)
BTT t− 1 0.137 0.022
(0.124) (0.070)
BTT without tax sparingt− 1 0.101 0.030
(0.086) (0.065)
Ln FDI conduit 0.011c 0.008
(0.007) (0.009)
Country pair fixed effects x x x x x x x x
Home country by time fixed effects x x x x
Host country by time fixed effects x x x x
Observations 8,974 8,974 8,974 8,947 10,594 10,594 10,594 10,566
Notes: The letters “a", “b" and “c" indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent.
Standard errors, which are clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses and time effects are
included.
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For comparison purposes, in Column (1) of Table 14 we simply replicate the results of our base-
line equation where BTTs are omitted. In Column (2), we substitute the dummy tax sparing by a
dummy BTT which takes the value one if the home countryi has a BTT with the host countryj in
year t − 1.26 The coefficient estimated on the dummy BTT is positive but is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. In Column (3) we want to include together thtax sparing and the BTT dummies.
However, both dummies have information in common. BTTs and tax sparing take the same value
one when a tax sparing provision is included in a BTT. To remove this redundant information, we use
a dummy "BTT without tax sparing" which takes the value one when a BTT is signed between two
countries but does not include a tax sparing provision. In other words, we estimate a coefficient for tax
sparing (corresponding to BTT with tax sparing) and a coeffici nt for BTT without tax sparing. The
coefficient estimated on the tax sparing dummy is unaffectedby the inclusion of the BTT dummy and
the coefficient estimated on BTT without tax sparing is positive but not statistically significant. This
result tends to indicate that investors are responsive to a particular provision of BTTs, tax sparing,
and not to the remaining provisions. Similar results are obtained in Columns (5)-(7) when we add
home-country by time and host-country by time fixed effects.
Tax Treaty Shopping
One concern when measuring the effect of tax sparing on FDI isthat the estimated increase in
bilateral FDI might result from ending a diversion of FDI dueto past treaty shopping, without affecting
the total stock of FDI. Treaty shopping with respect to tax sparing implies that FDI is diverted through
a third country to benefit from reduced corporate tax rates made possible under favourable tax sparing
treaties. To this effect, a tax sparing agreement must be signed between the host and the intermediate
country. When a tax sparing provision is agreed between two countries, FDI might not be diverted
anymore leading to an overestimation of the real effect of tax sparing on bilateral FDI originating
from the home country. In other words, the signature of tax sparing may have an effect on the origin
of FDI rather than leading to a real increase in bilateral FDI.27 To consider this possibility, the baseline
equation is augmented to include the role played by potential conduit countries. While the dependent
variable is unchanged and corresponds to the direct bilateral FDI from the home countryi to the host
countryj, we include as an additional determinant “ln FDI conduit", corresponding to the total FDI
26As for tax sparing, the BTT dummy is lagged by one year, as BTTstend to be effective on January of the year
following the entry into force. Similar results are obtained when the BTT variable is not lagged. These results are
available upon request.
27For example a tax sparing agreement entered into force between Luxembourg and Malaysia in 2004. Prior to this
agreement, Luxembourg FDI might have been diverted throughcountries such as the United Kingdom which has a tax
sparing agreement with Malaysia since 1973. From 2004, Luxembourg FDI might no longer be diverted, increasing then
the apparent effect of tax sparing.
43
from the home countryi to OECD countries having a tax sparing provision with the host c untryj.
The inclusion of this variable allows us to see whether FDI received by potential conduit countries
substitutes for bilateral FDI from the home countryi to the host countryj, as would be the case
with treaty shopping. In Column (4), the coefficient estimated on “ln FDI conduit" is positive, small
in magnitude and statistically significant at the 10 percentl vel. It is not statistically different from
zero in Column (8) when home-country by time and host-country by time fixed effects are included.
If anything, these results tend to indicate a complementaryrelationship between total home FDI in
potential conduit countries and bilateral FDI, and by extensio they suggest that the effect of tax
sparing on bilateral FDI is not overestimated by treaty shopping.
Tax Incentives
Another concern is that FDI may respond to tax incentives such as tax concessions and tax holi-
days which are not observed in this analysis. As tax incentivs may be correlated with tax sparing -
the aim of tax sparing being to allow investors to fully benefit from tax incentives - the omission of
tax incentives may lead to a spurious relationship between tax sparing and FDI. To address this issue,
we use the effective average tax rate (EATR) computed by Bosenberg and Egger (2017). This EATR
corresponds to the difference between the pre-tax and after-t x net present values of a hypothetical
investment in one period. Thus, it measures the discrete cost of capital associated with investing in
a country. This recent measure has the advantage of being available for a large number of countries
and of covering our period of analysis. Unfortunately, it isnot ideal for our purpose because it does
not reflect the actual taxes paid by multinational firms in a given host country, and is moreover not
country-pair-specific. However, it does address a potential shortcoming of our tax rate differential
variable used in the baseline analysis, namely that many FDIchoices are discrete rather than continu-
ous, and are influenced by the EATR rather than by the statutory ma ginal tax rate (which influences
instead changes in investment on the intensive margin). Thebas line equation is augmented with the
EATR in Column (1) of Table 15. The coefficient estimated on the EATR is negative and statistically
significant at the 5 percent level. The inclusion of this variable does not alter the estimated effect of
tax sparing.
Withholding Tax Rates
The robust positive elasticity estimated between tax sparing and FDI, is not statistically different
for FDI from territorial and worldwide tax systems, nor before and after a territorial tax reform.
This suggests that withholding tax rates on passive income are an important determinant of FDI.
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Table 15: Tax Incentives and Withholding Tax Rates
E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.) E(FDIijt)|.)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Ln home GDP 0.630a 0.619a 0.619a 0.565a 0.562a
(0.177) (0.170) (0.170) (0.178) (0.178)
Ln host GDP 0.568a 0.569a 0.569a 0.556a 0.555a
(0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.086) (0.085)
Ln host population -0.945 -0.033 -0.033 -0.883 -0.875
(0.678) (0.118) (0.118) (0.609) (0.607)
Bilateral trade costs -0.018 -0.111a -0.111a -0.039 -0.040
(0.128) (0.041) (0.041) (0.121) (0.122)
Home financial crisis -0.108b -1.048c -1.049c -0.107b -0.107b
(0.043) (0.620) (0.620) (0.042) (0.042)
Tax differential -0.029 0.448 0.449 1.401b 1.477b
(0.483) (0.432) (0.432) (0.597) (0.597)
Tax sparingt− 1 0.620a 0.622a 0.623a 0.538a 0.521a
(0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.179) (0.162)
EATR -1.153c
(0.666)
WTR interest 0.280
(0.543)
WTR royalties 0.208
(0.509)
GTR interest -1.632b
(0.728)
GTR royalties -1.762b
(0.726)
Country pair fixed effects x x x x x
Observations 6,945 8,654 8,654 8,966 8,974
Notes: The letters “a", “b" and “c" indicate respectively a significance level of 1, 5 and 10 percent.
Standard errors, which are clustered at the country-pair level, are in parentheses and time effects are
included.
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To test directly the responsiveness of FDI to withholding tax r tes, in Column (2) of Table 15 we
include a withholding tax rate on interest and a withholdingtax rate on royalties. Both variables
correspond to the negotiated bilateral withholding tax rate if there is a BTT in place between the
home and the host country, or correspond to the "non-treaty"wi hholding tax rate of the host country,
in the absence of a BTT. This data comes from Ernst and Young (2012) “Worldwide Corporate Tax
Guide". These variables are time varying as the withholdingtax rate changes when a BTT enters
into force or is terminated.28 The coefficients estimated on both interest and royalties withholding tax
rates are not statistically significant. Two reasons may explain this result. First, without tax sparing,
withholding tax rates are expected to have a limited effect on FDI as they are fully compensated by an
immediate and generally higher statutory tax rate in the home country (deferral is not possible with
passive income under both a worldwide and a territorial tax systems). Second, under tax sparing,
the rate which matters for investors is the one corresponding to the difference between the effective
withholding tax rate and the notional withholding tax rate.29 As indicated in Section 2, to quantify the
fiscal advantage of a tax sparing provision with passive income, three tax rates are required: the host
country effective withholding tax rate, the host country nominal withholding tax rate, and the home
country statutory tax rate. In the absence of data on effective w thholding tax rates, following Azémar
et al. (2007) we make the assumption that passive income benefits from tax holidays abroad. This
hypothesis seems realistic since as indicated by the OECD (2015), tax holidays are reported to be the
most popular tax concessions offered by developing countries, being used by 82-88 percent of them.
To be more specific about the use of tax holidays, Table 16 reports Hanson (2001)’s table on corporate
income tax exemption for selected developing countries in 1990 and 1998. We extend these data for
the year 2013 using PriceWaterhouseCooper Worldwide Tax Summaries corporate taxes 2013/14.
This table shows that tax holidays are frequently used by theselected developing countries and, when
the data are available, for a substantial amount of time (up to twenty years). By assuming that the
effective withholding tax rate on passive income equals zero, we can calculate a global effective tax
rate on passive income.
The global effective tax rate of interest payments depends on th, wif andw
′i
f , whereth is the
home country statutory tax rate,wif the notional (foreign) withholding tax rate on interest andw
′i
f the
28As previously indicated, 293 changes occur between 2002 and012.
29Note that the larger the difference between the effective withholding tax rate and the notional withholding tax rate,
the larger the tax benefit of tax sparing. As emphasised by theOECD (1998), tax sparing may create an incentive for
host countries to maintain higher rates of taxes as comparedto non-sparing countries. Interestingly, our data suggests
that the withholding tax rates on interest and royalties arehigher in bilateral tax treaties with tax sparing as compared
to in bilateral tax treaties without tax sparing. The averagwithholding tax rate on interest corresponds to 9.35 percent
in BTT with tax sparing versus 8.33 percent in BTT without taxsparing. The average withholding tax rate on royalties
corresponds to 10.46 percent in BTT with tax sparing versus 7.76 percent in BTT without tax sparing.
46
Table 16: Corporate income Tax Exemption
1990 1998 2013
CIT exemption Period CIT exemption Period CIT exemption Period
Cote d’Ivoire n.a. n.a. x 5-8 years x 5-15 years
Egypt x 5-20 years x 5-20 years
Gabon x 0-10 years x 0-10 years x 2 years
Nigeria x 0-5 years x 0-5 years x 3-5 years
Argentina x
Brazil x
Guatemala x x x 5-10 years
Mexico
Peru x x x
India x 5 years x 5 years x 3-10 years
Philippines x 3-6 years x 3-6 years x 6 years
Chile x
Sri Lanka x x 4-12 years
South Africa x x
Thailand x 3-8 years x 3-8 years x 10-15 years
Source: Hanson (2001) for the years 1990 and 1998, PWC Worlwide Tax Summaries Corporate Taxes 2013/14
for the year 2013.
effective (foreign) withholding tax rate on interest. Similarly, the global tax rate on a royalty payment
depends onth, wrf andw
′r
f , wherew
r
f andw
′r
f are the notional and effective (foreign) withholding
tax rate on royalty, respectively. With the tax holidays assumption,w
′i
f = 0 andw
′r
f = 0. Under
tax sparing, investors are allowed to reduce their home tax liability by a foreign tax credit equals
to a notional amount of host country tax that would have been paid had the tax holiday not been in
effect. The global tax rate of an interest payment corresponds thus toth − wif if th > w
i
f , and to
zero if th < wif . Without tax sparing, the global tax rate of an interest payment equalsth as we make
the assumption that investors benefit from a tax exemption abroad. Note that the statutory tax rate
of OECD countries is generally higher than the withholding taxes of developing countries, thus even
without the tax holiday assumption, the global tax rate on passive income would correspond toth in
the majority of the cases. The same method is applied to calculate the global tax rate on royalties.
Both global tax rate measures, of interest payments and royalties, are summarised in Table 17.
The global effective tax rates on interest and royalties areincluded in our baseline equation, re-
spectively in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 12. The coefficient estima ed on both variables is negative
and statistically significant at the one percent level. These r ults indicate that when corrected for tax
sparing benefits, withholding tax rates on passive income are important determinants of FDI. For the
first time across the various estimations performed, the estimated coefficient reported on tax sparing
decreases in magnitude (from 0.62 to 0.54-0.52). This indicates that part of the effect of tax sparing
agreements is captured by the impact they have on effective tax ra es on interest and royalties.
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Table 17: Measure of the Global Tax Rate on Passive Income in the Presence of Tax Holidays
Without tax sparing With tax sparing
Interest payments:
If th > wif th th − w
i
f
If th < wif th 0
Royalties:
If th > wrf th th − w
r
f
If th < wrf th 0
Note: Under the assumption of tax holidays,w
′i
f = 0 andw
′r
f = 0.
5 Conclusion
Developing countries’ efforts to attract multinational firms with tax holidays and other fiscal incentives
may potentially be undone by the tax system of the multinatiol firm’s home country. Tax sparing
provisions have emerged as a mechanism that is included in many bilateral tax treaties (BTTs) to
prevent host country tax incentives being nullified by residnce country taxation. While tax sparing
has been widely discussed, prior empirical analysis of its consequences has been extremely limited.
In this paper, we construct a new dataset of tax sparing provisions by coding the presence of this
provision in the bilateral tax treaties between 23 OECD countries and 113 developing and transition
economies over the period 2002-2012. We merge this data withdata on bilateral FDI, and various rel-
evant country-pair characteristics to form a dataset that has 8,974 observations on 1,941 country-pairs
in the baseline specification. In this analysis, we use two distinct sources of variation - the signing or
termination of tax sparing agreements, and quasi-experimental variation generated by territorial tax
reforms in residence countries that change the value of pre-existing tax sparing provisions.
We find that tax sparing agreements are associated with an increase of up to 97 percent in the stock
of FDI. This effect does not differ across worldwide and terri o ial residence countries. It is robust to
including various controls, and is not driven by other features of BTTs. It is also robust to controlling
for treaty shopping and source country tax incentives. Muchof the effect of tax sparing appears
attributable to its impact on credits for withholding taxeson interest and royalties (which applies to
both worldwide and territorial home countries). The territorial reforms in four residence countries -
Norway in 2004, and the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand in 2009 - during our sample period do not
lead to a significant change in FDI (consistent with the absence of differences across worldwide and
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territorial home countries).
Our results suggest that the growth of tax sparing provisions n bilateral tax treaties can be an
important tool to encourage FDI in developing countries. The results also highlight the continuing
relevance of tax sparing provisions in a world in which most re idence countries are territorial. They
should thus be of interest to scholars and policymakers in the area of economic development, as well
as to those interested in international taxation and publicfinance. They also point to the importance
of controlling for tax sparing provisions when studying cross-border FDI flows and other topics in
international economics, even when the effects of taxes arenot the primary focus.
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